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In James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), 
when the eponymous “justified sinner,” Robert Wringhim, first contemplates the 
possibility of publishing his memoirs he declares, “I thought if once I could print my 
own works, how I would astonish mankind, and confound their self wisdom and their 
esteemed morality – blow up the idea of any dependence on good works, and 
morality, forsooth!” (152). Wringhim’s confessional text, said to be uncannily 
recovered from his grave and presented as an authentic manuscript by an “Editor”, 
recounts how he comes to take the Calvinist doctrine of predestination to its 
antinomian extreme – becoming convinced by a mysterious figure, Gil-Martin, who 
may be either a figment of his diseased imagination or the devil himself, that as one of 
the ‘elect’ he may never truly sin. He is led to commit fratricide, which at first enables 
him to become heir to the estate of Dalcastle, but his narrative ultimately culminates 
in exile and suicide. Wringhim claims that he cannot remember the murderous deeds 
and licentious actions he is accused of committing while resident at Dalcastle, and 
faced with conflicting evidence, the reader is left to guess whether he is at times in a 
delusional state or possessed by the devil.  
The unaccountability of Wringhim’s experience by either rational scientific or 
traditional supernatural explanations was recognised, albeit unappreciatively, by its 
earliest reviewers (see: “Hogg’s Confessions”). Modern critics have come to view this 
technique as one of the most powerful aspects of Hogg’s masterpiece and as 
pervading his corpus as a whole; however, André Gide’s contention in his 
introduction to the pivotal Cresset edition, that the fantastic aspects of Confessions are 
“always psychologically explicable, without having recourse to the supernatural” (xv), 
has reverberated through Hogg scholarship, with scholars providing psychoanalytic 
and modern psychiatric interpretations, as well as working to identify aspects of early 
nineteenth-century scientific and medical culture that may have informed the text.
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Some find such “psychological” readings unconvincing. In his Afterword to the 
Stirling/South Carolina edition, Ian Campbell asserts that, “Obviously”, reading Gil-
Martin as “a delusion of Wringhim’s imagination [. . .] might involve a more 
extensive knowledge of the subconscious mind than could be expected of Hogg’s own 
time” (185–6). This may be true in regard to psychoanalytic readings, but the vast 
range of contemporary scientific writings on proto-psychological subjects in the early 
nineteenth century could have provided a formulation for a purely hallucinatory 
experience deeply connected to the mind and body of the individual. If they do not, 
this was a powerful authorial choice. 
Scientific writings that provided physiological explanations for apparently 
supernatural experiences were in vogue in Edinburgh when Hogg composed the 
Confessions, and these writings developed in close dialogue with the literary debate 
surrounding the ‘explained supernatural.’ According to E. J. Clery, Ann Radcliffe’s 
use of this technique was a response to the unacceptability of encouraging 
superstitious beliefs in her readers, but despite her initial critical success, both 
Coleridge and Sir Walter Scott soon critiqued her “enlightenment endings” (108). 
Writing in the Quarterly Review in May 1810, Scott’s primary critique of Radcliffe’s 
use of the explained supernatural was the “total and absolute disproportion between 
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the cause and effect, which must disgust every reader much more than if he were left 
under the delusion of ascribing the whole to supernatural agency” (344). The popular 
medical treatises of John Ferriar, John Alderson and Samuel Hibbert, which worked 
to provide physiological explanations of apparently supernatural experiences, appear 
to be, at least in part, responses to Scott’s critique. The second edition of Hibbert’s 
Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions; or, An Attempt to Trace such Illusions to 
their Physical Causes, published in 1825, was dedicated to Scott, and Ferriar brought 
An Essay Towards a Theory of Apparitions (1813) into dialogue with literary criticism 
in the preface, in which he offered “to the manufacturers of ghosts, the privilege of 
raising them, in as great numbers, and in as horrible a guise as they may think fit, 
without offending against true philosophy, and even without violating probability” 
(vii). While Ferriar began to outline his basic physiological argument for a naturalistic 
understanding of apparitional experiences in a paper delivered to the Literary and 
Philosophical Society of Manchester in 1786, it was not until after Scott and 
Coleridge’s critique of Radcliffe that he brought his theory into direct dialogue with 
literary culture. 
 In turn, in his Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft (1830), Scott cited “the 
learned and astute Dr Ferriar of Manchester” (22) and discussed Hibbert as “most 
ingeniously, as well as philosophically” treating the subject from “a medical point of 
view” (22–3). Scott extracted “singular and interesting” (23) cases from their works, 
while also piously concluding that “[t]he abstract possibility of apparitions must be 
admitted by everyone who believes in a Deity, and His superintending omnipotence” 
(47).
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The ‘Ettrick Shepherd’, however, was often more critical of the rationalising 
tendencies of the era, and in the prefix to his tale, “The Mysterious Bride,” published 
in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in December 1830, he classifies Scott among 
those who “now-a-days are beginning broadly to insinuate that there are no such 
things as ghosts, or spiritual beings visible to mortal sight” (155).3 As such, it would 
be easy to read the unaccountability of the Confessions as a critical subversion of the 
physiological ‘explained supernatural’ of the Romantic period. As Ian Duncan notes, 
Hogg specialised “in narratives that invoke the supernatural in order to affirm the 
potency of traditional rural culture” (Duncan, “Scottish Gothic” 76). However, despite 
his dedication to the traditional and the folkloric (particularly through his carefully 
constructed literary persona, the ‘Ettrick Shepherd’), Hogg was also clearly 
imaginatively stimulated by the vibrant scientific and medical culture of post-
Enlightenment Edinburgh. 
Hogg was enmeshed in the world of early nineteenth-century popular print 
culture, in which topics relating to the burgeoning mental sciences were thrashed out 
each month in the major review journals, such as the Edinburgh Review, as well as in 
popular literary magazines, such as Blackwood’s (in which the dubiously 
authenticating advertisement for the Confessions, “A Scots Mummy,” was published 
in August 1823). As such, despite his autodidactic background, the self-proclaimed 
“king o’ the mountain an’ fairy school of poetry” (Hogg, Anecdotes of Scott 61) 
would become “more attuned to the intellectual currents of advanced modernity, 
including radical materialism, than any contemporary Scots author” (Duncan, Scott’s 
Shadow 210). From his early authorship of a treatise on the diseases of sheep, to the 
apparitional encounters and apoplexies of Winter Evening Tales (1820) and “The 
Shepherd’s Calendar” series (1819–28), the “magic lantern” of The Three Perils of 
Man (1822), and the haunting portrayal of Gatty Bell’s galvanised body and coma in 
The Three Perils of Woman (1823), Hogg’s engagement with Romantic-era science 
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was both wide-ranging and sustained (see: Bold; Coyer; Inglis, ‘“My Ingenious 
Answer”; “Maternity, Madness and Mechanization”).  
Within the developing critical framework of Scottish Romanticism, critics are 
now accustomed to viewing Hogg’s engagement with Romantic-era science in terms 
of his critique of the post-Enlightenment Scottish ‘romance revival’ led by Scott and 
the wits of Blackwood’s Magazine. Modernity’s attempts to retrieve, preserve and, at 
times, reanimate the past – based on the assumption that the past has indeed been 
surmounted in the linear stagewise progress of Enlightenment stadial theory – are 
subverted, as Hogg confounds “both scientific and folkloric modes of representation” 
in uncanny images such as the “upright corpse” (Duncan, “Scottish Gothic” 77; “The 
Upright Corpse”; Scott’s Shadow 183–214). This article, however, is concerned with 
how supposedly conflicting epistemological frameworks work together in Hogg’s 
masterpiece. Drawing upon a range of scientific discourses, including the popular 
nineteenth-century ‘science’ of phrenology as well as theories of somnambulism, 
apparitional experiences, and addiction, the first sections of this article work to 
illustrate the contemporary physiological reasoning that underlies both the 
psychological and the demonic dimensions of Robert Wringhim’s experience. They 
argue that, despite the logical contradictions of the text, the same natural order may be 
seen to preside over both realms. Rather than reading Hogg’s work against the 
backdrop of Enlightenment stadial theory, the final section turns to a major 
contemporary figure, the Reverend Thomas Chalmers, who worked to illustrate the 
compatibility of Romantic-era science and supernatural Christianity and, crucially for 
the relevance of his work to Hogg’s, was also an outspoken critic of antinomianism. 
The resonances between the Confessions and Chalmers’ writings in the 1820s and 
1830s demonstrate that Hogg’s engagement with nineteenth-century science should be 
read as an integral part of his creative engagement with fanatical antinomianism: in 
stark contrast to Wringhim’s avowed attempt to “blow up the idea of any dependence 
on good works, and morality”, the scientific discourses drawn upon by Hogg gesture 
towards physiological determinism only to emphasise the ability of habitual thoughts 
and actions – ‘good works’ or sinful transgressions – to transform the mind and the 
body, and thus ready the individual for the world to come.  
 
Phrenological Predestination and Duplicity 
Phrenology was one of the most debated topics in Edinburgh in the 1820s. The 
Edinburgh Review provided informed critique while Blackwood’s led the way with 
satirical non sequitur and Gothicised parody, although “it is sometimes difficult to 
differentiate parody from formal model” (Strachan 58). Similarly, the Editor in the 
Confessions, anxiously grasping after the suicide’s skull in the final exhumation 
scene, declares that he is “no phrenologist” (172), but as Peter Garside indicates, he 
“nevertheless manages to sound like one” in his descriptions of the extraordinary 
smoothness and roundness of the skull and the “little protuberance above the vent of 
the ear” (lii). Garside notes that the location of the protuberance corresponds to the 
phrenological organ of “Destructiveness,” which is found to be large in the heads of 
“cool and deliberate murderers” (Transactions of the Phrenological Society, qtd. in 
Garside 254), and G. A. Starr has argued that Hogg may be pointing towards the 
parallel between antinomian predestination and the physiological determinism of 
phrenology: “Each body of belief, Hogg may be implying, tends to relieve the 
individual of moral responsibility by accounting for behaviour in a rigidly 
deterministic manner” (83). However, the observation on “the almost perfect 
rotundity” (172), which intriguingly points towards a nineteenth-century 
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conceptualisation of the double self, has yet to receive critical commentary and 
importantly undercuts the notion of rigid physiological determinacy that the citation 
of phrenology immediately prompts. 
Indicative of the continued currency of ‘the Great Chain of Being’ into the 
nineteenth century, the phrenological organs were divided into those faculties shared 
by both humans and lower animals and those unique to mankind.  The propensities, 
such as ‘Amativeness’, ‘Acquisitiveness’, and ‘Destructiveness’, and the inferior 
sentiments, such as ‘Love of Approbation’ and ‘Self-Esteem’, were common to both 
man and beast. The superior sentiments distinguished man as a moral being, and 
included such faculties as ‘Benevolence’, ‘Veneration’, ‘Firmness’, 
‘Conscientiousness’, and ‘Hope’. In some persons the animal propensities and inferior 
sentiments might be so dominant as to render them innately unfit to function in 
civilised society. In contrast, the moral sentiments might predominate to the extent 
that a person could not help but live a righteous life. According to the first major 
populariser of phrenology in Britain, Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, such a person “has 
no occasion for any law either for putting in action the superior faculties, or for 
preventing the abuses of his animal faculties, and is really elect” (500). However, the 
vast majority of persons fell into a third category, in which moral and animal faculties 
displayed a degree of balance and hence produced conflicting emotional responses. 
Such persons are characterised by the Edinburgh phrenologist, Robert Cox: “In the 
heat of passion they do acts which the higher powers afterwards loudly disapprove, 
and may truly be said to pass their days in alternate sinning and repenting” (57). As 
Gil-Martin indicates, “We are all subjected to two distinct natures in the same person” 
(132). 
A skull in which all organs were of a similar size would be round and smooth, 
and the implication of the Editor’s observation is that Wringhim’s animal and moral 
faculties are (with the exception of his large ‘Destructiveness’) balanced, indicating 
internal struggle. Wringhim writes of his youthful propensity towards sinfulness and 
attempts at repentance, and during his final days at Dalcastle he reports to be “at one 
time worshipping with great fervour of spirit, and at other times so wholly left to 
myself, as to work all manner of vices and follies with greediness” (133). In contrast 
to Wringhim’s perceived status as one of the elect, the presence of an internal struggle 
emphasises the strong role of personal choice in determining the direction of his moral 
pathway. During the two periods of ablated consciousness at Dalcastle, this internal 
struggle appears to cease, and his violence, intemperance, gaudy dress, and 
licentiousness plausibly indicate a decided dominance of the animal faculties.  
Barbara Bloedé has speculated that the case of Mary Reynolds, a so called 
“nineteenth-century case of double personality,” may have been a model for 
Wringhim’s dual states and notes that, like Mary Reynolds, whose alterations occur 
after a long period of sleep, “at least one of Robert’s returns to consciousness after a 
period of amnesia occurs after waking from a ‘profound and feverish sleep’” (120). 
Bloedé provides a convincing analysis of the commonalities between Reynolds’s and 
Wringhim’s conditions as well as the sources from which Hogg may have acquired 
information about this and other similar cases. S. L. Mitchell’s “A Double 
Consciousness, or a Duality of Person in the same Individual,” published in the 
Edinburgh Weekly Journal in 1816, discusses Reynolds’s case, and a “Report on a 
Communication from Dr. Dyce of Aberdeen, to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, ‘On 
Uterine Irritation, and its Effects on the Female Constitution’,” published in 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1823, presents the case of another 
woman who experienced a similar phenomenon. Ian Hacking’s work on the history of 
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what is today referred to as multiple personality disorder indicates that Mary 
Reynolds’s case would have been classified as a form of somnambulism, emerging 
from phrenological conceptualisations of the double brain. Hacking identifies the 
second edition of Robert Macnish’s The Philosophy of Sleep, published in 1834, as 
the most prominent source text for later discussions of Reynolds’s case or “la dame de 
Mac-Nish” as she would become known in France (Hacking 139–40). The 
phrenological account of somnambulism forwarded by Macnish in 1834 is derived 
from The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim (1815). According to 
Spurzheim all the various phenomena of sleep may be explained by the principle that 
“any particular organ, or even several organs, may be active while the other organs 
rest” (216). The period of ablated consciousness at Dalcastle may then be read as a 
variation on somnambulism, in which the animal faculties, over-stimulated by Gil-
Martin, take control of Wringhim’s actions. Macnish would later explain why over-
stimulated faculties dominate a person’s dreams, as a person’s “pursuits in life, by 
strengthening one faculty, make it less susceptible, than such as are weaker, of being 
overcome by complete sleep” (The Philosophy of Sleep 63).  
George Combe, the Edinburgh lawyer who became the leader of the Scottish 
phrenological movement, referenced both Dr. Mitchell’s and Dr. Dyce’s reports in A 
System of Phrenology as cases that lead some persons to believe that the conscious “I” 
may be attributed to a singular organ (107–12). Drawing upon the philosophy of 
Thomas Brown, he went on to delineate the more probable theory that consciousness 
was an overarching mental state to which particular faculties contribute. As such, the 
phenomenon of double consciousness remained “inexplicable” in phrenological terms 
(518). Macnish similarly wrote that “the particular state of the brain which induces 
such conditions will, I believe, ever remain a mystery,” and, like Combe, noted the 
analogy between the state of mind during double consciousness and that which occurs 
during “magnetic sleep” (The Philosophy of Sleep 184–5). In a later “Case of Divided 
Consciousness,” presented in a letter to the editor of the Phrenological Journal and 
Miscellany of Edinburgh, Combe tentatively asserted that the condition was the result 
of the brain being in an overall different condition rather than the affection of a 
particular organ, but observed that in the diseased state the organs of the propensities 
seem to be more active and the moral sentiments less active in comparison to the 
normal condition. Oddly, Combe did not appeal to the dual hemispheres of the brain 
in his explanation. 
Phrenological anatomy was vital to the nineteenth-century understanding of 
the double brain (Harrington 6–34). Each phrenological organ had its own double in 
the opposite hemisphere, thus raising the possibility that a single side of the brain 
might be diseased. As such, in 1815 Spurzheim argued that “it is not true that 
consciousness is always single” (220) and evidenced his assertion with the 
observation that “[a] great number of madmen hear angels sing, or the devil roar &c. 
only on one side” (221). The locational specificity of Wringhim’s delusion during a 
strange distemper in Edinburgh, wherein his loss of consciousness is still only partial, 
may be based on this conceptualisation of the double brain. While he lies in bed 
Wringhim conceives himself “to be two people”: “I deemed there were two of us in it; 
when I sat up, I always beheld another person, and always in the same position from 
the place where I sat or stood, which was about three paces off me towards my left 
side” (106). Hogg appears to be laying down markers for plausible physiological 
explanations by modelling the periods of ablated consciousness on medical case 
studies of double consciousness that evaded full explanation (even by such an avowed 
rationalist as George Combe). At the same time, the most plausible scientific 
Journal of Literature and Science 7 (2014)                                                  Coyer, “Embodied Damnation”: 1-19 
6 
© JLS 2014.   Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 
Downloaded from <http://www.literatureandscience.org/> 
explanation of Wringhim’s experience is, like the scientific literature that tries to 
exorcise it, unaccountable. 
 
Apparitional Explanations and a Murderous Stimulant 
Wringhim’s uncharacteristic sensual behaviour at Dalcastle may, of course, also be 
read as a demonic possession; if so, however, Hogg’s devil acts through natural 
means. In his “Hymn to the Devil,” first published within The Three Perils of Man 
(1822) and later inserted in the Noctes Ambrosianae dialogues of Blackwood’s in 
March 1825, Hogg portrays a tangible devil, speeding through the night air, wreaking 
havoc by influencing the visions of those asleep. Drawing upon the externalist theory 
of dreaming, as forwarded by the Scottish metaphysician, Andrew Baxter, which 
argued that immortal spirits take over the external sensory apparatus during sleep and 
stimulate them so as to generate motions of the nerves and the corresponding ideas, 
the devil is shown to control the sensory apparatus of the dreamer, framing “images” 
(“Hymn to the Devil” 33) and able to “[t]ickle” and “teaze” (61) the passions. In the 
Noctes Ambrosianae Christopher North responds to what he refers to as the 
Shepherd’s “Ode to the Devil” by asking if he has seen “Dr Hibbert’s book on 
Apparitions?” (370)  
North is, of course, referring to Hibbert’s Sketches of the Philosophy of 
Apparitions (1824), cited above as one of several popular medical treatises on the 
topic of apparitions that were published contemporaneously with the Confessions. 
Ferriar’s An Essay Towards a Theory of Apparitions (1813) was the most influential, 
but in An Essay on Apparitions, in which their Appearance is Accounted for by 
Causes Wholly Independent of Preternatural Agency (1823), John Alderson accuses 
Ferriar of plagiarising his theory of apparitions, first presented to the public in an 
essay published in the Edinburgh Medical and Chirurgical Journal in July 1810 (viii). 
A new and enlarged edition of Alderson’s text was published by Longman in 1823 
(notably the same publisher as Hogg’s Confessions), and in the winter of the same 
year, Hibbert read an “Essay on Spectral Impressions” to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh. The popularity of his essay led to the production of the full-length volume 
of 1824 and the second edition of 1825 (Hibbert v). Carrying on from Ferriar’s essay, 
which was more valuable for “affording abundant evidence of the existence of morbid 
impressions of this nature, without any sensible external agency, than in establishing, 
as he proposed, a general law of the system, to which the origin of spectral 
impressions could be inferred” (242), Hibbert defined apparitions as “nothing more 
than ideas, or the recollected images of the mind, which have been rendered as vivid 
as actual impressions” (v). 
The Edinburgh phrenologists were keenly interested in apparitional 
phenomena. In a letter to Hibbert in 1824 Combe writes that the subject has “formed 
part of my lectures for the three last seasons,” and the Phrenological Journal included 
a review of Hibbert’s work, which criticised his neglect of the phrenological 
principles that clarified the specificity of the delusion according to the plurality of 
organs. They explain: 
 
The brain consists of a congeries of organs, each of which manifests a 
particular power of the mind. Among these organs one serves to perceive 
Form; another Colour; a third Size; while other and distinct faculties and 
organs experience emotions and reflect. Each faculty being active, produces 
the special kind of ideas which it is fitted to form; and each may become 
active by an internal stimulus of its organ. The organs may be excited by an 
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unusual influx of blood into the vessels which supply them; by 
inflammation; or by nervous irritation. (547)  
 
Read in terms of the phrenological theory of apparitions, Gil-Martin may be read as a 
projection of ideas, associated with specifically diseased (i.e. over-stimulated) 
phrenological organs, vivified to the intensity of actual impressions.  
As Gavin Budge has explained, so-called “Brunonian” theories of stimulation 
informed early nineteenth-century apparitional theories (11–14). The Scottish 
physician, John Brown, developed this controversial medical theory, which defined all 
diseases as the result of excessive or insufficient nervous stimulation and was viewed 
by many as a radical simplification of the nervous physiology of his teacher, William 
Cullen (Lawrence). In the medical writings of the early nineteenth century, rather than 
the immortal spirits of Baxter’s externalist theory, a range of psychological and 
environmental factors were invested with the potential to excite the nerves and vivify 
their corresponding ideas. Such increased vivacity, according to Hibbert, for example, 
was linked to “some peculiar state of the sanguineous fluid” (69–70), comparable to 
the state induced by Sir Humphry Davy’s nitrous oxide experiments. For Hibbert, a 
wide range of factors might lead to a similar state, including constitutional tendencies, 
“suppression of accustomed evacuations” (102), poisons, inebriation, and, more 
generally, “nervous irritation” (101). However, such “morbific” affections also 
interacted with “moral agents” to give the spectral illusion its particular character 
(315), and he cites Pinel on the prevalence of religious fanaticism in acting as such a 
moral agent (330). 
Just prior to Wringhim’s first meeting with Gil-Martin, he is in a state of 
religious ecstasy. Having finally learned of his assured position among the elect from 
the Reverend Wringhim, his “whole frame seemed to be renewed; every nerve was 
buoyant with new life” (80). Upon first meeting the “stranger youth,” the physicality 
of the moment intensifies, and Wringhim declares: “I can never describe the strange 
sensations that thrilled through my whole frame at that impressive moment” (80). This 
intensified nervous stimulation is maintained during their meeting, as Wringhim 
writes that his “mind had all the while been kept in a state of agitation resembling the 
motion of a whirlpool” (81). Hogg appears to be gesturing towards the physiological 
state associated with delusional apparitional experiences, and in accordance with 
Brunonian medicine, this experience also exhausts Wringhim’s frame. He departs 
“not with the same buoyancy and lightness of heart” (82), and upon his arrival home 
the Reverend Wringhim declares that he has been physically “transformed, since the 
morning” (83). 
Accounts of “the addictive spiral created by overstimulation of the nerves” 
(Budge 12), wherein greater levels of stimulation are continually required to achieve 
the same effect, are characteristic of Brunonian medicine. In Hogg’s novel, Gil-
Martin – who at first appears to be a hallucinatory result of Wringhim’s nervous 
excitement – comes to himself act as an intense stimulant. Wringhim refers to his 
“thirst” (107) for his companionship and rapidly develops an inability to “live without 
him” (88) and a corresponding disdain for the comparatively mild stimulation of his 
mother and Reverend Wringhim’s religious bombast. His thirst for the company of 
Gil-Martin is mirrored in his growing desire to kill his brother. He writes, “I had a 
desire to slay him, it is true, and such a desire too as a thirsty man has to drink” (101). 
Eventually, Wringhim turns to the more traditional stimulating properties of alcohol. 
Gil-Martin and Mrs. Keeler both accuse him of “extreme inebriety” (121) upon his 
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waking from the first period of ablated consciousness at Dalcastle, and the second 
period is preceded by heavy drinking. 
Richard Jackson has noted the similarities between Wringhim’s experience 
and the opium eating famously described in De Quincey’s Confessions of an English 
Opium-Eater, first serialised in the London Magazine in 1821. He does not argue that 
Wringhim is taking opium, but rather that Hogg was aware of its effects and is 
drawing upon this knowledge in his portrayal of Wringhim’s experience. In his first 
popular medical treatise, The Anatomy of Drunkenness (1827), Macnish draws upon 
De Quincey’s Confessions in the chapter on “Drunkenness Modified by the 
Inebriating Agent” and explains the difference between the drunkenness of opium and 
wine: 
 
There is more poetry in its visions, more mental aggrandisement, more 
range of imagination. Wine invigorates the animal powers and propensities 
chiefly, but opium strengthens those peculiar to man, and gives for a period, 
amounting to hours, a higher tone to the thinking faculties. (22–3) 
 
Hogg’s choice of wine over opium for Wringhim’s inebriation accords well with the 
murderous stimulatory propensities of Gil-Martin. While the insinuation that 
Wringhim was in fact inebriated during the months of conscious oblivion tempts the 
rationalising reader to ignore the diabolical dimension, Hogg’s utilisation of a 
physiological phenomenon also serves to demarcate the fleshly nature of evil. His 
addiction to Gil-Martin becomes an addiction to his demonic stimulation of his 
“animal powers and propensities.” 
According to phrenological theory, the actions of Gil-Martin, would stimulate 
the lower faculties of ‘Destructiveness’, ‘Self-esteem’, ‘Love of Approbation’ and 
‘Acquisitiveness’, and suppress the superior faculties of ‘Benevolence’, ‘Veneration’, 
and ‘Conscientiousness’.  While interrupting his prayers, Gil-Martin elevates 
Wringhim’s “spiritual pride” (81) and presents the advantages to be gained from “the 
estate and riches” (100) of Dalcastle at the small cost of destroying sinners whose 
presence degrades the life of the elect. Taking a demonic reading into account, Gil-
Martin’s “cameleon art” enables him to enter into Wringhim’s mind and thus 
formulate his discourse to stimulate the animal faculties in such a way as to increase 
his propensity towards evil behaviours. Conformable to Baxter’s externalist theory, 
such stimulation is more easily achieved during sleep: 
 
But the most singular instance of this wonderful man’s power over my 
mind was, that he had as complete influence over me by night as by day. 
All my dreams corresponded exactly with his suggestions; and when he was 
absent from me, still his arguments sunk deeper in my heart than even when 
he was present. (93) 
 
The phrenological explanation of dreaming and somnambulism, in which only certain 
faculties are active during sleep, also conforms well to the increased potency of Gil-
Martin’s arguments. Spurzheim explains that “the manifestations of the active organs 
are then often more perfect and more energetic; the sensations are more lively, and the 
reflections deeper, than in a state of watching” (217–18).  
Physiology here underpins both demonic and psychological readings. 
However, in waking life the “natural, and amiable” (100) feelings against the socially 
destructive force of murder work against Gil-Martin, as “there are certain trains and 
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classes of thoughts that have great power in enervating the mind” and “[t]hese 
THOUGHTS are hard enemies wherewith to combat!” (110–11). Wringhim’s final 
murders do not occur until his body and mind have been so amalgamated with Gil-
Martin as to prevent internal conflict. This amalgamation is accompanied by both 
moral and physical decay, attributable both to Gil-Martin’s demonic influence and to 
the ravages of the guilty conscience that persistently returns to haunt Wringhim’s 
lucid moments. 
   
The Devil of the Flesh 
At their final meeting, Mrs. Calvert evokes potent Biblical imagery in her description 
of the moral and physical degradation of Wringhim: 
 
“I never in my life saw any human being,” said Mrs. Calvert, “who I 
thought so like a fiend. If a demon could inherit flesh and blood, that youth 
is precisely such a being as I could conceive that demon to be. The depth 
and the malignity of his eye is hideous. His breath is like the airs from a 
charnel house, and his flesh seems fading from his bones, as if the worm 
that never dies were gnawing it away already.” (62) 
 
Wringhim, or his devilish doppelgänger, at this point has murdered his brother, 
mother, and potentially his lover, all with the conviction that as one of the elect he 
may never truly sin. As the notes to the Stirling/South Carolina edition indicate, “the 
worm that never dies” refers to Isaiah 66.24 and Mark 9.43-9.48. It is “[o]ne of the 
attributes of hell spoken of by Jesus,” and according to David Lyle Jeffrey, this 
“image gives rise to grotesque imaginings in memento mori literature of the late 
Middle Ages” and “became a circumlocution for the operation of the conscience in 
medieval morality plays” (851). Jeffrey notes its utilisation by De Quincey and Poe to 
express “unrelieved grief” in the nineteenth century (851), and in an essay on “Ghosts 
and Dreams” for the Glasgow periodical, The Emmet, in 1824 Macnish draws upon 
this imagery in commenting upon the racked conscience of the murderer: “For him is 
reserved the worm that knaws unseen – the pang that never dies” (292). Macnish then 
returns to the image in his short fictional pamphlet, Confessions of an Unexecuted 
Femicide (1827), which Karl Miller has read as “responding to Hogg’s recently 
published Confessions” (206), to describe the murderer’s remorseful suffering. The 
image serves as a poignant indication that one may escape the punishment of the laws 
of men, and thus remain “unexecuted,” but one may not escape divine justice as 
inscribed in the natural laws of mind and body. 
Thomas Chalmers also evokes this image in what Jonathan Topham terms his 
“natural theology of conscience” (165–8). Though best remembered for his leadership 
in the Disruption of 1843, Chalmers first gained popular renown primarily through his 
Discourses on the Christian Revelation, Viewed in Connection with the Modern 
Astronomy (1817), and following on from the success of the “Astronomical 
Discourses,” he continued to draw upon connections between evangelical theology 
and Romantic-era science in his writings.
4
 He came to view human conscience as the 
“strongest presumptive evidence for the existence of a moral governor” (Topham 
165), and Topham identifies his Bridgewater Treatise, On the Power, Wisdom, and 
Goodness of God, as Manifested in the Adaptation of External Nature, to the Moral 
and Intellectual Constitution of Man (1833), as the culmination of this discourse. In 
this treatise Chalmers draws upon the same delineation of natural laws – both moral 
and physical – that Combe avowed in The Constitution of Man in Relation to External 
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Objects (1828), and Combe thought Chalmers’ work was bordering upon plagiarism 
(Hilton 195; van Wyhe 195–6). A primary difference between the two texts is that, 
unlike Chalmers, Combe bypasses the notion of original sin and thus the need for 
divine revelation (van Wyhe 196). However, both emphasised the need for man to 
understand his natural moral and physical constitution for the betterment of the 
individual and society. As Roger Cooter aptly observes, despite its “Calvinist” 
inheritance, phrenology “fulfilled the optimistic implications of evangelical 
Arminianism, the possibility of perfection on earth” (194). While Combe focuses 
upon the importance of phrenological principles in teaching persons to maintain an 
appropriately restrained balance between their animal and moral faculties (the very 
restrained balance that Wringhim fails to manage), Chalmers more broadly builds 
upon the “moral sense” philosophy predominant in Scotland from Francis Hutcheson 
onwards, focusing more exclusively on the innate benevolence of mankind. 
While maintaining the doctrine of predestination, Chalmers’ “natural theology 
of conscience,” particularly as it developed within his Sermons Preached in St. John’s 
Church, Glasgow (1823), critiqued those who dismissed the importance of good 
works. For example, in a sermon “On the Doctrine of Predestination” he declares the 
ultimate fate of every individual to be “one of the secret things which belong to God” 
(Sermons Preached in St. John’s Church 297). However, he explains, “the same God 
who ordains the end, ordains also the means which go before it” (Sermons Preached 
in St. John’s Church 311), and “unless the deeds done in your body be good deeds, 
and ye bring forth those fruits of righteousness which are by Jesus Christ to the praise 
and glory of God, ye shall not be saved” (Sermons Preached in St. John’s Church 
312).  
Crawford Gribben has shown that the Wringhims’s particular brand of 
antinomianism is not representative of any sect of Scottish Calvinism, historically or 
in the 1820s (13). However, beyond the often-cited relevant historical context of the 
“Marrow Controversy” of 1718–23, the text is generally responsive to the “hardening 
of attitudes” (Garside xxvii) regarding predestination within the Scottish Kirk and 
among Dissenting groups through the 1820s. It is this dogmatism and particularly 
dogmatic antinomianism that Chalmers likewise rhetorically targets in his sermons. 
For example, in “The Nature of the Kingdom of God” he critiques the “impregnable 
Antinomian” for thinking “he will have heaven, because he has faith,” defending the 
importance of good works by underlining the continuity of moral character between 
this life and next, as “[i]t is here that heaven begins. It is here that eternal life is 
entered upon. It is here that man first breathes the air of immortality” (Sermons 
Preached in St. John’s Church 235). He continues this line of argument in a sermon, 
“Necessity of Moral and Spiritual discipline of the whole Life” (later renamed 
“Heaven a Character and not a Locality” in his Collected Works), delivered “at the 
National Scotch Church, Regent Square, July 7, 1833,” wherein he declares that “[i]f 
the moral character, then, of these future states of existence were distinctly 
understood, and constantly applied, it would serve directly and decisively to 
extinguish Antinomianism” (“A Sermon, Delivered by the Rev. Dr. Chalmers” 72). 
Chalmers appeals to “the worm that dieth not” twice in this particular sermon. 
Hell and heaven are depicted as moral characters, rather than physical locations, and 
he analogises a material image of hell with the depravity of the distempered individual 
on earth: 
 
Each is ripening for his own everlasting destiny; and, whether in the 
depravities that deepen and accumulate on the character of the one, or in the 
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graces that brighten and multiply upon the other, we see materials enough 
for the worm that dieth not, or for the pleasures that are for evermore. (66–
7) 
 
In a characteristic appeal to those physiognomic principles shared by Hogg, the 
physical appearance – “[t]he stoop, the downcast regards, the dark and sinister 
expression of him who cannot lift up his head among his fellow men, or look his 
companions in the face” (67) – signifies moral character on earth and is a preview of 
the “dire and dreadful pandemonium” to come (68). “[I]n the full and final 
developments of character alone”, Chalmers sees “enough for imparting all its 
corrosion to the ‘worm that dieth not’ – enough for sustaining in all its fierceness ‘the 
fire that is not quenched’” (68). Chalmers’ utilisation of “the worm that dieth not” in 
this sermon represents an overarching motif in his works (see: Chalmers Sermons and 
Discourses 1: 127, 142–3, 179, 234, 363–4, 545, 601), and Hogg’s similar use serves 
as a potent critique of the malevolent consequences of Wringhim’s fanatical 
antinomian beliefs. 
Wringhim’s failure to recognise this posited continuity between this life and 
the next and, importantly, the resultant connection between the corporeal body and the 
immortal spirit is a major factor in his progressive demise.
 
When Gil-Martin first 
suggests the murder of Mr. Blanchard (a man who shares the title of “[t]he most 
popular of all their preachers of morality” (97–8) in Glasgow with Chalmers), 
Wringhim’s body reacts against the cold inhumanity of the murder: 
 
I was so shocked, that my bosom became as it were a void, and the beatings 
of my heart sounded loud and hollow in it; my breath cut, and my tongue 
and palate became dry and speechless. (92) 
 
As Chalmers explains, “our Maker” has so “framed our mental constitution, that in the 
very working of these bad affections there should be the painfulness of a felt 
discomfort and discordancy” (On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, 1: 102), 
and this immediate response was distinguished from the latter reflexive pains of a 
remorseful conscience – the “worm that dieth not”. However, like Combean 
phrenology and Brunonian concepts of addiction, Chalmers also recognised the power 
of habit in reinforcing vice or virtue (On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, 
1: 133–57). In accordance with these contemporary theories, through the dually 
consolidating acts of dreaming and discoursing, Wringhim is soon able to rationalise 
the murder of Blanchard, as Gil-Martin’s powers over his mind and body grow. Still, 
however, when the time comes to act, his “hand refused the office” (96). Eventually 
the body, devoid of the conscious mind, acts to perpetrate matricide and femicide, and 
Wringhim is forced to suffer retribution for crimes of which he has no knowledge. 
The amalgamation of the devil within the flesh by this point in the narration coalesces 
with the cessation of the “natural, and amiable” bodily feelings (100). Hauntingly, 
Gil-Martin declares, “Our beings are amalgamated, as it were, and consociated in one, 
and never shall I depart from this country until I can carry you in triumph with me” 
(130), 
As Gil-Martin physically wanes away in tandem with Wringhim, he 
persistently disregards the moral significance of the flesh, encouraging him to throw 
“off this frame of dross and corruption, mingle with the pure ethereal existence of 
existence, from which we derived our being” (161). This disregard for the flesh 
contrasts starkly with Chalmers’ conceptualisation of the afterlife. In his sermon, “The 
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Transitory Nature of Visible Things,” published one year prior to the Confessions, he 
declares: “There is reason for believing, that some of the matter of our present bodies 
may exist in those more glorified and transformed bodies which we are afterwards to 
occupy” (Sermons Preached in St. John’s Church 140). This is in apparent contrast to 
the “common imagination” of paradise as “a lofty aerial region, where the inmates 
float in ether, or are mysteriously suspended upon nothing” (Sermons Preached in St. 
John’s Church 196).  
Chalmers’ evocation of a literal conceptualisation of the final resurrection 
places him within a line of writers working to mediate materialist science and a truly 
supernatural Christianity. Andrew Baxter forwarded an embodied conception of the 
afterlife, viewing the final resurrection as transformative and positing that “a small 
quantity of that bulk of matter that now composes them, will serve for corporeal 
systems in those finer regions” (Baxter 292–3, qtd. in Jackson, “James Hogg’s The 
Pilgrims of the Sun and the Great Chain of Being” 74). Joseph Priestley  and Thomas 
Forester  appealed to an embodied conception of the afterlife in their defenses of 
materialism (Priestly xxiii–xxiv; Forester 101) and in his earlier poem, The Pilgrims 
of the Sun (1815), Hogg’s own visionary dreamer and cosmological traveller, Mary 
Lee, learns that those who reside on a sphere closer to the sun and therefore to divine 
existence, in “the land of lovers, known afar, / And named the Evening and the 
Morning star” (3.147–48), are beauteous due to the embodied nature of the Christian 
salvation.
5
 More recently, in an essay on the compatibility of modern neuroscience 
and Christianity, Ted Peters argues that a belief in the separate existence of an 
immaterial soul is unnecessary and is, in fact, a false conflation of Christian theology 
and Cartesian dualism, and he rhetorically emphasises that through the ages 
“Christian teaching regarding the resurrection has consistently insisted on embodied 
salvation” (313). 
In the Confessions Wringhim longs for what will be revealed to be an 
ultimately unachievable purely ethereal existence: 
 
When my flesh and my bones are decayed, and my soul has passed to its 
everlasting home, then shall the sons of men ponder on the events of my 
life; wonder and tremble, and tremble and wonder how such things should 
be. (80) 
 
Wringhim begins to recognise the coalescence of matter and spirit as he nears the end 
of his pilgrimage, but he is resistant to this realisation: 
 
I was become a terror to myself; or rather, my body and soul were become 
terrors to each other; and, had it been possible, I felt as if they would have 
gone to war. I dared not look at my face in a glass, for I shuddered at my own 
image and likeness. (156–7) 
 
The terror of glimpsing Gil-Martin’s hideous visage (which presumably mirrors 
Wringhim’s degraded state), however, leads to hellish epiphany: 
 
Involuntarily did I turn round at the request, and caught a half glance of his 
features. May no eye destined to reflect the beauties of the New Jerusalem 
inward upon the beatific soul, behold such a sight as mine then beheld! My 
immortal spirit, blood, and bones, were all withered at the blasting sight; 
Journal of Literature and Science 7 (2014)                                                  Coyer, “Embodied Damnation”: 1-19 
13 
© JLS 2014.   Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 
Downloaded from <http://www.literatureandscience.org/> 
and I arose and withdrew, with groanings which the pangs of death shall 
never wring from me. (162) 
 
The fleshly eye and the heavenly eye are one and the same, and the body withers with 
the spirit.  The physicality of Wringhim’s sufferings comes to a fevered pitch in his 
second to last entry: “My vitals have all been torn, and every faculty and feelings of 
my soul racked, and tormented into callous insensibility” (165). Wringhim’s suicide is 
the ultimate culmination of his inability to grasp the spiritual significance of corporeal 
life, and the uncanny preservation of his corpse underlines the embodied nature of his 
eternal damnation. Wringhim’s longings for “utter oblivion” (126) and “peace or rest” 
(153) are never fulfilled, as the series of grave-disturbers continue the physical 
assault, fragmenting his body as Gil-Martin fragmented his consciousness.  While the 
mismatched descriptions of Wringhim’s corpse in “A Scots Mummy” and in the 
Editor’s coda to the novel are certainly part of the greater overall incongruity of the 
text, the shifting appearance also mirrors the scene in the weaver’s cottage, wherein 
Wringhim’s clothing is mysteriously changed in his sleep. The implication may be 
that Gil-Martin’s power over Wringhim’s body continues beyond the grave – the flesh 
remains demonically shiftable. 
 
The Nature of the Diabolic 
The explanatory tensions of Confessions may be read as a purposeful effort by Hogg 
to maintain both demonic and psychological readings in an age in which physicians, 
such as Ferriar, systematically dismissed supernatural experience as “a symptom of 
bodily distemper, and of little more consequence than the head-ach and shivering 
attending a common catarrh” (Ferriar 138). However, rather than focusing upon 
tension, one may also view Hogg as organically fusing the diabolical with the most 
advanced Romantic science, and as such, echoing commentators such as Chalmers 
who sought to productively mediate materialist science and supernatural Christianity. 
The significance of the embodied damnation of Robert Wringhim is not a doctrinally 
specific critique. Rather, it is a critique of the way in which his fanatical 
antinomianism forces him to deny the “natural” human feelings and societal bonds, 
which at this time were being reified in medical and scientific discourses.  
Chalmers propagated naturalistic scientific discourses as part of his larger 
project to form what Stewart Brown terms his “godly commonwealth” – a “new moral 
order” of society (Brown 138), which attempted to revive what he perceived as the 
benevolent communitarian values of the traditional rural Scottish parish system in the 
urban, industrial cities of nineteenth-century Scotland. Chalmers’ experiment at St. 
John’s parish in Glasgow, which he initiated in 1819, is the most famous application 
of his doctrines (Brown 129–51). The Disruption of 1843, with its breakdown of the 
collective influence of the Kirk over Scottish society, represented the “final failure of 
his godly commonwealth ideal” (Brown 373–4) and ended the possibility of realising 
his (to borrow Gillian Shepherd’s literary analogy) inherently “Kailyard” vision (314). 
Not unlike Chalmers, Hogg was concerned with preserving the traditional 
culture of rural Scotland against the relentless forces of modernisation in the 
nineteenth century. While his precise position in contemporary theological debates is 
notoriously difficult to ascertain (Garside xxvii), as a stalwart defender of the 
traditional and the folkloric, throughout his corpus we find an equation of true 
Christianity and a belief in the supernatural. In his poem, “Superstition” (The Pilgrims 
of the Sun 67–73) which accompanied The Pilgrims of the Sun in its initial publication 
in 1815, the “sceptic leveler” (10) with his “eye of reason” (179) extinguishes the 
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belief in Providence, and “soon that heavenly ray must ever cease to shine” (180), and 
in his sermon on “Deistical Reformers” within A Series of Lay Sermons on Good 
Principles and Good Breeding (1834), he declares that the “error of this age is to 
believe too little”, decries their dismissal of Christianity on the grounds of its 
“incomprehensible” mysteries, and affirms that “wherever there is a display of the 
power or wisdom of God, either in revelation or the kingdom of nature, there also they 
will find a mystery beyond the capacity of human reason to unfold” (110). In the Lay 
Sermons, however, Hogg also discusses the “law of our constitution” (5), nature’s 
“immutable laws” (69), and the value of “habit” over “precept” (73) for engraining 
the hatred of vice and love of virtue implanted in youth as “a guard which the 
providence of God has placed over us” (53). Perhaps Hogg’s masterpiece may be read 
as a spectacularly chilling depiction of a “phenomena of nature” (Hogg, “A Scots 
Mummy” 139) – imaginatively fuelled by the power of contemporary science to reify 
traditional Christian morality, as well as to enable a vivid depiction of the horrifically 
tangible consequences of diabolical deviance. 
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Notes 
1. For a concise overview of the critical corpus, see Fielding 132–9. A key 
recent psychological reading not mentioned by Fielding is Faubert. 
2. On Scott and the science of apparitions, see Smajic, and Ferris. 
3. Ian Duncan reads this comment in “The Mysterious Bride” as a response to 
Scott’s Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft (“The Upright Corpse”). 
4. Hogg cites Chalmers’ “Astronomical Discourses” in a note added to his 
early experimental dream poem, The Pilgrims of the Sun (1815), in The Poetical 
Works of James Hogg (1822). Discussion of this citation is beyond the scope of the 
present article. On the success of the “Astronomical Discourses”, see Brown 107–09. 
5. See particularly, Part 3, lines 134–40 of Hogg’s poem. While not citing this 
particular passage, in his article on “James Hogg’s The Pilgrims of the Sun and the 
Great Chain of Being”, Jackson briefly discusses the significance of “Baxter’s 
explanation of the continued existence of both soul and body” (74) in relation to The 
Pilgrims of the Sun, the ballad of “Kilmeny” (included in The Queen’s Wake (1813)), 
and the short story, “On the Separate Existence of the Soul” (1831). 
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